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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over cases transferred to the 
Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 42. The Utah Supreme Court has original 
appellate jurisdiction over the instant case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-103-3(f). 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under the United States Constitution, Article 
III, to determine standing of the parties to bring an unlawful detainer action where they have 
no presumption of ownership interest in the property, upon which to evict. 
If standing exists, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Bill if Rights of the United 
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution, to ensure the uniform application of public 
policy with respect to substantive and procedural rights and equal protection under the laws 
to all people under its jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to interpret Federal Statutes and apportion 
damages accordingly per Utah Rule of Evidence 302 for per se violations as enumerated by 
Congress and the U.S. Code. 
This Court has jurisdiction by virtue of Appellants' timely filing of a Notice of Appeal 
within 10 days of the district court's final order entered on September 21, 2010. Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-6-813. 
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district 
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courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims 
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Title 28 of the United States 
Code, Part Iv, Chapter 85 § 1367(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Statutory compliance to effectuate a non-judicial rescission under the Truth in 
Lending Act, as amended, ("TELA") ignored by the lender in violation of the TILA, is in 
conflict with the lender's ability to bring a claim of unlawful detainer after a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale. In the alternative, the district court committed reversible error in granting 
judgment to plaintiff, through which plaintiff took possession of defendant's primary 
residence. 
Plaintiff s interest in the real property was terminated on March 18,2010, by affidavit, 
in the recorded Notice of Rescission. See Utah Code Ann. §§57-1-5.1 and57-4a-4. Pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-809(l), plaintiff cannot show they were entitled to possession at 
anytime thereafter. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-809(2), upon showing that any defendant in the 
action had been in quiet possession of the residence for the space of one entire year 
continuously before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest is not ended 
or determined, such showing is a bar to the proceedings. 
The standard of review for the interpretation of a statute is a question of law that is 
2 
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reviewed for correctness without any deference to the legal conclusions of the district court. 
See Jaques v. Midway Auto Plaza. Inc.. 2010 UT 54, *h 11, 240 P.3d 769. 
This issue was preserved in defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, objections 
throughout the unlawful detainer proceedings, and in defendant's Expedited Motion to Take 
Judicial Notice of Conflicting Laws and Presumptions. 
II. The district court committed reversible error in awarding Plaintiff an order of 
restitution, including attorney's fees, and costs. 
The standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact is deferential or de novo 
review of uniform application and is of high importance, as such, public policy considerations 
dictate the application of these legal concepts should be strictly controlled by the Appellate 
Court, granting no discretion to the district court and review of the mixed question for 
correctness. Levin. 2006 UT 50, H 23; State v. Brake. 2004 UT 95, ffi[14-15, 103 P.3d 699. 
The district courts determination should be reversed if the ruling "is so unreasonable as to be 
classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of discretion." Anderson v. Thompson, 
2008 UT App 3, Tf 11,176 P.3d 464. This issue was preserved for appeal through defendant's 
Motion to Re-frame Trial Structure, Stay Damages, and Supplement Jurisdiction. [R. 541-543, 
R. 544-549] 
III. The district court erred in awarding treble damages, incorrectly concluding 
plaintiff met their burden of proof, and that the disclosures provided were in line with TILA's 
high standard of strict compliance; when it found that: (1) homeowners had no rescission 
3 
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rights and that the home owner's rescission right's had expired; (2) the contract itself acted 
as the required disclosures, when it found that the Variable Rate was "clearly and 
conspicuously" disclosed, and the disclosures provided to defendant were correct for both the 
initial "Fixed" rate and consummated "Adjustable" rate; (3) the real property was not 
overvalued; and (4) plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attorney's fees and an award of 
the bonds. 
The district court erred in its application of facts under both state and federal law, 
expanding that error in finding facts which are unsupported by the evidence presented or 
excluding un-rebutted evidence to make no finding at all, and ultimately erred in it's reliance 
on erroneous conclusions of law. Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement Inc., 2008 UT 82, ^ f 23, 
199 P.3d 957, the district court's conclusions of law in civil cases are a question of law that 
we review for correctness, giving no deference to its legal conclusions. Ellsworth Paulsen 
Constr. Co. v. 51-SPR- L.L.CL 2008 UT 28, If 12, 183 P. 3d 248. 
When reviewing a district court's findings of fact, the appellate court follows the 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review contained in Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Under this 
standard of review, the appellate court will set aside fact findings only if they are against the 
clear weight of evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. The Court of Appeals also pared away the 
deference it afforded a juvenile court findings based on the Utah Supreme Court's holdings 
in Alta Industries v. Hurst 846 P.2d 1282, 1284 N.2 (Utah 1993), "that appellate courts do 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not give factual findings made by a district judge the same deference as those made by a jury." 
Id. In Utah R. Civ. Pro., Rule 52(a), the clearly erroneous standard, imported from the federal 
rule, requires that the findings (or the district court's verdict in a criminal case) are against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings (or verdict) will be set aside. S.B.D. 
and L.D.v. State. 2006 Utah 54; 147, P.3d, 401 (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1987)). In S.B.D., it is recognized that the "scope of review contemplated by rule 52(a) 
encompasses the entire factual record. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the appellate court 
to provide some indication that it performed its sufficiency of the evidence review in the 
context of the whole record, or at least that portion of the record to which its attention was 
drawn by the appellant's marshalling obligation." 
. This issue was preserved in defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, objections 
throughout the unlawful detainer proceedings, and in defendant's Expedited Motion to Take 
Judicial Notice of Conflicting Laws and Presumptions. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
a) The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1601-1693. 
b) 12 C.F.R. Part 226, known as "Regulation Z" 
c) U.C.A. §§ 78B-6-801 et seq. Unlawful Detainer Statute. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from a final judgment on claims plead in a Complaint filed in Third 
5 
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Judicial District Court, Case No.100905635, in an unlawful detainer suit filed under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-6-801 et seq, by Plaintiff/Appellee Utah First Federal Credit Union ("Utah 
First") to recover possession of certain real property and monetary damages, costs and fees, 
after holding a "non-judicial foreclosure sale" on March 18, 2010, which purportedly 
conveyed ownership of said property to Utah First by grant of a Trustee's Deed recorded 
sometime after the sale. 
Defendant/Appellant homeowners, Mr. John S. Dudley ("Mr. Dudley") and Mrs. Julie 
Dudley ("Mrs. Dudley") (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Dudleys"), and the 
Defendant/Appellant tenants, Mr. Christopher Green and Mrs. Vanda Green (the "Greens"), 
refute the validity of the non-judicial foreclosure sale and the conveyance of said property 
thereto by the Trustee's Deed by pleading certain facts, denials and affirmative defenses in 
their Answer, specifically, that Utah First failed to state a claim upon which eviction should 
be granted, or by which damages, costs and fees should be awarded, having misrepresented 
the legal scope and weight of the matter, and lacking standing to assert claims of ownership 
of the Property. Therefore, asking that Utah First take nothing thereby, and that Mr. Dudley 
be awarded costs, fees and such other and further relief as may be merited in the 
circumstances. 
This action proceeded over the course of one hundred and ten days (110), culminating 
in a one day trial, heard in eleven hours (11) over the course of three weeks. Utah First 
presented their case for eight (8) of those hours and the Dudley's were afforded three (3). 
6 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Utah First claims to have acquired title to real property located at 8028 Madsen Court, 
Sandy, Utah (the "Property"), through a non-judicial foreclosure sale. Utah First filed a 
complaint for eviction alleging, in part that they became the owner of the Property by 
acquiring it at a foreclosure sale. The Dudleys and the Greens, were residing in the Property, 
and Utah First alleged they were entitled to a reasonable rental in the amount of at least 
$1,500.00 per month beginning on March 19, 2010, and continuing until the Dudleys leave 
the Property. The Dudleys failed to pay any rent for the Property and on March 22, 2010, 
Utah First caused a Notice to Vacate to be served on the Dudleys and the Greens, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-805. The Notice to Vacate indicates the tenancy-at-will created 
by the foreclosure sale, is terminated, and the Dudleys must vacate the Property within five 
days of the date of the Notice to Vacate. Utah First claims the Dudleys refused to surrender 
the Property, therefore are guilty of unlawful detainer. Utah First finally asked for immediate 
possession of the Property, and treble damages. [R.l-7] 
The Dudleys specifically denied in their Answer the allegations made by Utah First 
in its Complaint concerning: (1) whether Utah First owns the premises; (2) whether Utah 
First unlawfully purchased a void security interest in the debt at an illegal foreclosure sale, 
due to Utah First's failure to respond to Mr. Dudley's rescissions of the loan; (3) whether 
Utah First misrepresented their authority claiming that the Property was sold at the foreclosure 
sale, despite that the power of sale is void, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); and (4) whether 
7 
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title was clearly perfected as argued by Utah First. The Dudleys further asserted affirmative 
defenses to Utah First's claims, asserting that Utah First failed to state a substantial claim 
upon which eviction should be granted and misrepresents the legal scope and weight of the 
matter, Utah First lacks standing to assert claims of ownership and rights to evict, further 
asserting that Utah First was served with a Notice of Rescission, failed to take action to seek 
a judicial determination on the merits of Mr. Dudley's rescission prior to exercising the power 
of sale from the Trust Deed. Upon exercise of Mr. Dudley's federally protected right to 
rescission, Utah First's security interest was automatically void pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 
163 5(b), and Utah First must take all the necessary steps to comply with the Truth in Lending 
Act within twenty (20) days from the date of the rescission. [R.9-12] 
The Dudleys filed a Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Utah First's Complaint, 
asserting the legal scope and weight of the TELA interpretation of the plain language of Title 
15 U.S.C. § 1635, regarding the automatic voiding of the security interest when rescission 
rights have been exercised. [R. 127-222] Utah First filed their response and a Cross Motion 
for Summary Judgment. [R.265-318] The District Court rendered a decision denying both the 
Dudleys Motion for Summary Judgment and Utah First's Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment via telephone conference with the parties. The District Court indicated that 
"ultimately, a short decision will issue on the matter." No written decision was ever formally 
issued on this denial of summary judgment. [Transcript of June 14,2010, Telephonic Hearing 
at Page 4, Lines 3 through 6.] 
8 
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On June 21, 2010, the Dudleys filed an Expedited Motion for Judicial Notice of 
Conflicting Law and Presumptions. [R.564-570] On June 20, 2010, the Dudleys filed a 
Motion to Re-frame Trial Structure, Stay Damages, and Supplement Jurisdiction. [R.541-549] 
Utah First files a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reframe Trial 
Structure, Stay Damages, and Supplemental Jurisdiction. [R.769-774] The District Court fails 
to render a decision on the Dudleys motion until the finality of the trial, wherein, the footnote 
of the Findings of Fact, indicate denial of the motion for the reason's set forth in Utah First's 
opposition. [R.1197] 
On or about November 5,2007, Mr. Dudley purchased real property located at 8028 
Madsen Court, Sandy, Utah (the "Property"). This was the original purchase of the real 
property. Mr. Dudley sought a fixed rate refinancing of the Property, and approached Dave 
Bastian of Utah First Credit Union to accomplish this goal. Utah First approved Mr. Dudley 
for a refinance on the Property in the amount of One Million Five Hundred Sixty Thousand 
Dollars ($1,560,000.00). 
One day prior to the closing of the loan with Utah First, November 15, 2007, Mr. 
Dudley was provided with a Good Faith Estimate that set forth the charges on the Note. 
[Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 4: Good Faith Estimate] On November 15,2007, Mr. Dudley signed 
this Good Faith Estimate. This Good Faith Estimate was without any specification of the loan 
program or mention of a variable rate. This was the only "Early Disclosure" in evidence, as 
received by Mr. Dudley. Utah First did not provide any "early look" documents, that would 
9 
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have allowed Mr. Dudley to contemplate the benefits of his loan, prior to closing, nor lead 
him to believe it was not the fixed rate loan he understood it to be. The bulk of Mr. Dudley's 
loan paperwork was signed and dated on the date of closing, and Mr. Dudley was only 
allowed the short closing at Utah First's office, for review and reading of his loan paperwork. 
On November 16,2007, Mr. Dudley attended the closing of the refinance, wherein he 
executed various pages of documents. Mr. Dudley executed an Adjustable Rate Note (the 
"Note"), wherein he borrowed $ 1,560,000.00 from Utah First. The Note provided for a fixed 
rate of interest for five (5) years, and then switched to a variable rate of interest thereafter. 
[Plaintiff s Trial Exhibit 1: Adjustable Rate Note.] The District Court did find that Mr. Dudley 
initially approached Utah First for a fixed rate loan. [Defendant's Trial Exhibit 10: 
Application and R.1198] Yet, the District Court found it to be a work in progress that was 
ultimately structured as a variable rate loan. [R.1198] At the closing, Mr. Dudley was 
provided a number of documents, and the District Court found that he had received three (3) 
copies of the Notice of Right to Cancel, and the Settlement Statement. [R. 1198] [Plaintiffs 
Trial Exhibit 13: Settlement Statement] The Notice of Right to Cancel gave Mr. Dudley three 
(3) business days to cancel the Note, and the loan funded on the fourth (4th) business day. 
[R.1199] 
Utah First was reimbursed by Mr. Dudley, One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150) for a 
credit report fee. Mr. Dudley presented evidence of the cost of Ninety Four and 30/100 
Dollars ($94.30) for obtaining his Credit Report. Defendant paid Fifty Five and 70/100 
10 
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Dollars ($55.70) more for the credit report fee than Utah First actually paid. [Defendant's 
Trial Exhibit 11: Credit Tech Statement.] 
Defendant reimbursed Utah First One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) as an appraisal 
fee. Evidence proved two (2) appraisals were ordered and charged to Defendant, as part of 
the amount financed. The first appraisal was Four Hundred Fifty Dollars ($450.00) and the 
second appraisal was Five hundred Fifty Dollars ($5 50.00). [Defendant's Trial Exhibits 9 and 
13: Appraisals.] Utah First initially obtained an appraisal of the Property from Brown 
Appraisal Services, establishing the value as One Million Three Hundred and Thirty 
Thousand Dollars ($ 1,330,000.00). Utah First intentionally omitted this appraisal from their 
discovery responses, ultimately delivering it, on the eve of trial, in mass via email. Utah First 
sought another appraisal from Campbell and Associates Inc., valuing the Property at One 
Million Nine Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($ 1,95 0,000.00) and omitting the previous 
MLS listing value, as well as the flood damage to the Property. This was the appraisal used 
to fund the loan to Defendant, and the appraisal provided to the Dudleys in discovery 
responses. 
At closing, Mr. Dudley was given a Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement ("TILA 
Statement"). This TILA Statement that identified the lender in the upper-left-hand corner; 
contained a table that clearly stated the amount financed; stated that the borrower had the right 
to receive an itemization of the amount financed; clearly stated the finance charge; stated the 
annual percentage rate; clearly stated the amount financed and the total of payments; stated the 
11 
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number of payments and due date; contained descriptive explanations of the terms "amount 
financed", "finance charge", "annual percentage rate", "total of payments"; contained a 
statement that security is being taken in the property and provided the address; stated any dollar 
charge or percentage amount which may be imposed by a creditor solely on account of late 
payment; stated that the Mr. Dudley will not pay a penalty if the loan is paid off early and will 
not be entitled to a refund of part of the finance charge; contained a statement that Mr. Dudley 
should refer to the appropriate contract document for any information such document provides 
about nonpayment, default, the right to accelerate the maturity of the debt, and prepayment 
rebates and penalties; and stated, "Assumption: someone buying your home may, subject to 
conditions, be allowed to assume the remainder of this mortgage on the original terms." 
[R.1199-1200] 
To secure performance of his obligation under the Note, Mr. Dudley granted Utah First 
a security interest in the Property by executing a Deed of Trust, naming Utah First as the 
beneficiary. This Deed of Trust was recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
[R.1198] 
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), the Lender bears the burden of establishing 
compliance with respect to disclosure requirements, and the district court found Utah First to 
have met that burden. [R. 1200] 
Mr. Dudley elected to receive an itemization of the amount financed and was thus 
provided with the Settlement Statement that the district court found accurately reflected the 
12 
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finance charges. The district court further found that the $42.99 charge for "Survey to Pest 
Inspection to the Cottonwood Improvement District" was not a finance charge as the term is 
used under 15 U.S.C. § 1605. [R.1200] Utah First originally submitted the First American 
Title Settlement Statement ("First American Settlement Statement). This document was 
altered, and objections were made immediately to the alteration of the document. The last page 
of the US Department of Housing and Urban Development Settlement Statement ("HUD 1 
Settlement Statement") was removed and added as the last page of the First American 
Settlement Statement. [Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 13: First American Title Settlement Statement, 
and Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 6: US Department of Housing and Urban Development HUD 1] 
In reviewing the document version and set noted on the lower left hand corner of the HUD 1, 
and the page number, with the initials on each page, it is obvious which pages define the 
complete document. The First American Settlement Statement has no such definitions on the 
pages, and although there was an obvious replacement of the last page of the HUD 1, it was 
admitted into the record as an exhibit. An objection was made and noted, yet the exhibit was 
left as Utah First presented it and not repackaged to correctly reflect the documents true 
corners. No evidence was presented by Utah First proving that Mr. Dudley received the First 
American Title Settlement Statement, and the HUD 1/1A that was signed as received by Mr. 
Dudley did not disclose the payment of the $42.99 amount listed, and at issue here. The 
amount deposited into Defendant's account upon funding of the loan was exactly $42.99 short, 
and no proof was presented as to the payment of this fee. 
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Prior to foreclosure sale of the Property, Defendant rescinded the Note, as early as 
February 2, 2010, and again on March 18, 2010. On February 3, 2010, Defendant sent a 
second "Qualified Written Request" to Utah First and the successor Trustee, Marlon Bates, in 
which he requested copies of the loan documents and a postponement of the foreclosure 
proceedings. This was sent by fax, hand delivery and mail. [Defendant's Exhibit 1 and 2: 
Qualified Written Request and Notice of Rescission.] Utah First failed to respond in any way, 
within twenty (20) days, as required under both Section 6 of RESP A, and 15U.S.C.§1635 and 
Regulation Z § 226. On March 18,2010, Utah First proceeded with the foreclosure sale, and 
UtahFirstpurchased the Property backfor $900,000.00, credit, as the highest bidder. [R.1201] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court's decision to dispose of the Dudleys' TILA claims, in order to find 
them guilty of unlawful detainer, is contrary to established law and flies in the face of the 
equitable tenets intended to preserve fairness and uniformity. Utah First lacked standing to 
bring their claim for unlawful detainer, and the district court should have dismissed it as a 
matter of law. Based upon the evidence provided, the district court found "the paperwork 
behind the loan from Utah First to Dudley is not worthy of imitation" but inaccurately 
concluded no violation of federal law. [R. 1197] As a broadly accepted public policy, courts 
of law and equity do not allow wrongdoers to profit from their wrongs. The district court erred 
in interpreting 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), statutes as to be 
"generally" complied with, when Congress intended strict interpretation, and not applying and 
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requiring the "absolute" compliance of Utah First. 
After mistakenly concluding that the presumption of title, could and should be resolved 
within the unlawful detainer, and after an examination of the contract dispute, the district court 
committed additional error by splitting Defendant's claims apart, hearing some portions, but 
not all, effectively rendering the dispute without remedy. Creating no clear framework within 
which to present the issues, the district court incorrectly applied facts and concluded that the 
evidence presented, showed "general compliance" to Federal law, hence finding that Utah First 
had carried its burden and proved their right to possession of the Property. Yet, TELA is a 
cornerstone of consumer credit legislation. TELA was Congress's effort to guarantee the 
accurate and meaningful disclosure of the costs of consumer credit, which enables consumer's 
to make informed choices in the marketplace. In order to achieve this remedy, its been widely 
held that the statute demands strict compliance. 
ARGUMENT 
L An interpretation of two conflicting laws, which Appellant finds himself the 
unwitting victim of, U.C.A. 78B-6-802.5 et seq. — Unlawful detainer after 
foreclosure or forced sale, brought in retaliation, to a homeowners claim for 
rescission, raised prior to sale of the home, as a defense to foreclosure, under 15 
U.S.C. §1601 et seq. - Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). 
15 U.S.C. § 1635(f), allows consumers to rescind "any consumer transaction. . . in 
which a security interest... is or will be retained or acquired in any property which is used as 
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the principal dwelling of the person to whom credit is extended," so long as such rescission 
takes place within three days of the consummation of the transaction or the deliver of required 
material disclosures under TILA, whichever occurs later. In order for Dudleys' to have an 
extended right to rescind under TEA, Utah First must have failed "to make a material 
disclosure; mere technical violations warrant damages only." McGinnis v. GMAC, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 90286 (quoting Taylor v. Domestic Remodeling. Inc., 97 F.3d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 
1996)) The provisions of TILA and of 12 C.F.R. ("Regulation Z") establish a three-year period 
applicable in the absence of material disclosures. The Dudleys, contrary to the findings of the 
district court, did not receive material disclosures and his right to rescind was extended to the 
applicable three-year period. 
A consumer is defined under Regulation Z § 226.2(a)(l 1), consumer means a "natural 
person to whom consumer credit is offered or extended." For the purpose of rescission, the 
term also includes a "natural person in whose principal dwelling a security interest is or will 
be retained or acquired, if that person's ownership interest in the dwelling is or will be subject 
to the security interest." Mrs. Dudley, the legal spouse to Mr. Dudley, had an fifty percent 
(50%) ownership interest in the Property, and never received any disclosures, and all the 
evidence indicates that Mrs. Dudley never received any disclosure and did not receive Notice 
of Right to Cancel. No Evidence has been produced, nor discovered, indicating Mrs. Dudley 
received any documentation from Utah First. Testimony was given that only Dave Bastian, 
Aimee Ellett and Mr. Dudley attended closing of the loan. 
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On February 2,2010, Mr. Dudley notified Utah First of his intent to rescind the security 
interest placed on the Dudleys' family home. Mr. Dudley's rescission was a lawful notice of 
rescission, served on Utah First, in writing, and by fax. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b), as implemented 
under 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(1), confirms the effects of rescission, and states, "[w]hen a 
consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of rescission 
becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including any finance 
charge." 12 C.F.R., commonly referred to as Regulation Z, further clarifies this consumerright 
in the Official Staff Commentary on Regulation Z, wherein the "security interest is 
automatically negated regardless of its status." (Emphasis added) The procedure for the 
return of money or property upon Mr. Dudley's exercise of his right to rescind the transaction 
is set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b), which provides: 
"When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a), he is not 
liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the 
obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void 
upon such a rescission. Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the 
creditor shall return to the obligor any money or property given as earnest 
money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or 
appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the 
transaction." Moore v. Cycon Enterprises, Inc., 2007 U.S. District LEXIS 
9423. 
This subpart also sets forth the procedure one is to follow to effect a rescission. Utah 
First, as the creditor, must act first. The creditor must, within twenty days after the obligor 
exercises the right of rescission, and provides the creditor with proper notice, return to the 
debtor any money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or 
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appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction. 
Utah First failed to take any action as required under this statute and proceeded to non-judicial 
foreclosure, without regard for Mr. Dudley's Federal consumer rights. 
After the tolling of the statutory twenty days had passed, and Mr. Dudley's tender 
negotiations failed, Mr. Dudley recorded a Notice of Rescission, which substantially followed 
the form presented in UTAH CODE ANN. 57-1-5.1. Utah First filed their action under the 
presumption that the Trustee's Deed was a valid deed. Mr. Dudley's affidavit, which was 
recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, was filed prior to the foreclosure sale, 
and Utah First's Trustee's Deed was filed after the recordation of the affidavit. The 
determination of presumption with regard to the Trustee's Deed versus that of Mr. Dudley's 
affidavit, by way of his Notice of Rescission that terminated Utah First's security interest in 
the Property, is essential to the case at hand. Without the power of sale, title was not perfected, 
and Utah First had no standing to bring their unlawful detainer action. 
If a lender acquiesces to a notice of rescission, then the security interest would have 
become void, triggering the sequence of events laid out under TILA. Utah First failed to 
acquiesce, yet, also failed to contest the notice. If Utah First had contested the notice, they 
would have been provided the opportunity to produce "evidence sufficient to create a triable 
issue of fact about compliance with TILA's disclosure requirements." Utah First did not 
contest Mr. Dudley's right of rescission by way of their unlawful detainer Complaint. In fact, 
Utah First intentionally chose to ignore Mr. Dudley's Notice for more than forty one days (41), 
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more than twice the time allowed to respond, and plowed over the possibility that Mr. Dudley 
had a right to rescind, usurping the equitable authority granted to the court to determine 
rescission. When the right to rescind is determined, the security interest would become void, 
yet, this would be through the act of contesting Mr. Dudley's right of rescission. Utah First 
did not contest Mr. Dudley's right to rescind, they ignored it, proceeded to a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale, and subsequently filed a complaint for eviction, none of which are remedies 
to the determination of Mr. Dudley's rescission rights. In light of the passage of time to 
respond under the statute, Utah First acquiesced by default to Mr. Dudley's rescission. 
"The unlawful detainer statute is a summary proceeding and in derogation of the 
common law. It provides a severe remedy, and this Court has previously held that it must be 
strictly complied with before the cause of action may be maintained." Sovereen v. Meadows. 
5 95 P.2d 852 (Utah 1979). Persons being found guilty not only face the loss of their home, but 
damages of treble the amount of daily rents, attorneys fees and costs. Because of the harshness 
of this remedy, Utah has long held plaintiffs to a high standard of compliance under the 
statutory schema, and historically, maintained a narrow scope focusing the action on resolution 
of the question of possession. This has served to protect not only the property owners, by 
giving them swift return of property unlawfully withheld, but also offered a measure of 
protection to tenants by limiting the amount of damage that may accrue. 
Utah First filed a Complaint for Eviction, under the Utah's unlawful detainer statute. 
In support of this action, a Trustee's Deed was attached, as prima facie evidence, that they 
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were in fact "entitled to the possession at the time of the forcible detainer." Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-6-809(l), this recorded Deed, executed by a Trustee, subscribed, sworn and 
notarized, was used by Utah First as proof that they were "entitled to the possession at the time 
of forcible detainer." By virtue of the deed's recording, Utah First was granted the 
presumption, that it was genuine, voluntarily executed, and delivered. See generally Utah 
Code Ann. §57-4a-4(l)(a) (d)(2000). The Dudleys timely answered the complaint asserting, 
by way of affirmative defenses, TELA and rescission under 15 U.S.C 1635(b). Utah First 
requested an expedited hearing, pursuant to U.C.A. §78B-6-810(2)(a), and was granted the 
same on April 16, 2010, in front of Judge Himonas. At the Immediate Occupancy Hearing, 
Utah First began by requesting a possession bond then made a brief opening statement after 
which, the Dudleys presented the court with a courtesy copy of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, reiterating the defense plead in answer to Utah First's complaint. 
Appellants assert Utah First's claims failed as a matter of law, disputing their 
entitlement to possession, on grounds that Mr. Dudley had advanced a claim for rescission, and 
due to Utah First's failure to make material disclosures under TILA, and having notified Utah 
First of his intent to rescind in writing, by way of a lawful notice of rescission, such claim had 
neither been challenged by Utah First, nor determined in accordance with federal law. 
Appellants successfully argued, that both Utah First and trustee Marlon Bates had actual and 
constructive notice of the claim for rescission prior to the sale. The sale should not have been 
held, and as such, the Dudleys retained ownership of the property. Mr. Dudley attached a 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
notarized, and recorded "Notice of Rescission" as prima facie evidence in support of his claim, 
believing that it would be afforded the same presumptions granted to Utah First, that it was 
genuine, voluntarily executed, and delivered to all parties in interest. Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-6-809(2), in defense to unlawful detainer, Mr. Dudley needs to show that he, and those 
whose interest in the premises he claims, have been in the quiet possession of the property for 
the space of one entire year continuously before the commencement of the proceeding, this was 
and is undisputed by Utah First, and that his interest is not ended or determined. Once Mr. 
Dudley established that he and those whose interest in the premises he claims were in quiet 
possession of the property for the space of one entire year continuously before the 
commencement of the unlawful detainer action, and that his interest is yet to be determined, 
the proceedings under Utah's unlawful detainer statute was barred and Mr. Dudley is not guilty 
of unlawful detainer. 
II THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF UTAH'S 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER PROCEEDINGS 
The district court failed to uniformly follow either, the statutory scheme of Utah's 
expedited unlawful detainer actions as currently interpreted under Bichler v. DEI Industries, 
Inc., 2009 UT 63. Further, the district court failed to follow the statutory scheme of the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.5 as amended by the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform Act, depriving Appellants of due process and equal protection under Article III 
of the U.S. Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, and Article I §§ 7 
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and 24 of the Utah Constitution, producing unjust results, and in turn refusing to take 
jurisdiction over all the Dudleys' claims, which share a common nucleus of facts, and dispose 
of the entire dispute. 
The district court found Utah First's complaint, in conjunction with the Appellants' 
affirmative defenses, "not an appropriate case for the expedited evidentiary hearing." [R. 1247, 
Trans, pg 9 at 19-21] Bonds were posted by both parties, in the amount of Four Thousand Five 
Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00). Utah First attempted to increase the bond twice by arguing that 
litigation of this matter would take six months at least. [R. 1247, Trans, pg 10 at 15-19] Later, 
before Judge Kelley, when faced squarely with the question of the heart of Utah First's claim, 
Utah First's counsel stated that "TILA litigation would be a good year in litigation." [R. 1249: 
Trans, at Page 19, Line 17-18.] Judge Kelley clearly understood the policy of the unlawful 
detainer statute and the hazards in trying a complaint, with the affirmative defenses as plead 
by Mr. Dudley. The purpose is uniformity and strict adherence to both State and Federal 
statutes. However, the district court, made a determination that Utah First would receive "a 
very expedited setting here," without regard to the underlying claims at issue. [R. 1247, Trans, 
pg 10 at 21] 
Mr. Dudley moved the district court to re-frame the trial structure, stay damages, and 
take supplemental jurisdiction. The district court denied this motion, but not until he 
incorporated various findings based on questions of Federal law, well outside of the unlawful 
detainer statute, and outside of Utah First claims as plead. In essence, the district court 
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proceeded outside of the bounds of the unlawful detainer proceedings. Mr. Dudley's 
affirmative defenses do not directly relate to the issue of possession, which is the basis of Utah 
First's, ascertain for standing in their complaint. In Bichlerv.DEI, the Supreme Court of Utah 
recognized that one of the "primary puposes of the unlawful detainer statute is to provide a 
speedy resolution on the issue of possession." Bichlerv.DEL 2009 UT 63. Said policy is best 
served by following the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, without carrying out narrow 
exceptions. See U.C.R.P. 54(b) 
With this requirement, the district court should have provided a speedy resolution of the 
issue of possession, while holding that "in an unlawful detainer action with multiple claims or 
counterclaims, a rule 54(b) entry of final judgment resolving the issue of possession is proper 
when it includes all claims and counterclaims that are necessary to determine lawful possession 
of the property." Id. The district court summarily disposed of Mr. Dudley's contracts claims, 
by making findings and conclusions, outside of the unlawful detainer statute, with blanket 
denial of Mr. Dudley's motion to re-frame trial structure, stay damages, and take supplemental 
jurisdiction, which said findings are contrary to the denial of the Mr. Dudley's motion. If the 
district court was going to render findings, as they did, with regard to Mr. Dudley's Federally 
protected rights, as plead in the affirmative defenses, then the district court "must resolve all 
claims relating to possession." Id. The district court, having full knowledge of Mr. Dudley's 
claims, all revolving around a common nucleous of facts, had an obligation not to deprive Mr. 
Dudley of recourse or remedy on those claims, through a determination on possession in a 
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unlawful detainer. 
III. UTAH FIRST DID NOT MEET THE BURDEN O F PROOF AS A CREDITOR, AND T H E 
DISCLOSURES PROVIDED WERE NOT IN COMPLIANCE UNDER TILA 
The district court erred when it interpreted the rebuttable presumption of delivery of the 
material disclosures. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635( c), written acknowledgment of receipt of 
any disclosures . . . does no more than create a rebuttable presumption of delivery thereof. 
This presumption was rebutted by testimony of Mr. Dudley, that the disclosures were not 
given. Once Mr. Dudley provided the testimony that he did not receive the disclosures, it is 
incumbent the creditor is to "produce some positive evidence that delivery' of the documents 
occurred." Jackson v. US Bank, 245 B.R. 23 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (quoting Williams v. Gelt 
Financial Corp., 237 B.R. 590,595 (E.D. Pa. 1999). The district court heard testimony of the 
closing agent, Aimee Ellett, wherein, she was unable to specifically identify the disclosures 
provided to Mr. Dudley, at closing. Aimee Ellett's ("Ms. Ellett") testimony was limited to the 
"habit" or customary practice of the lender to provide disclosure documents to its customers. 
[R.1256: June 21,2010 Trans, at pages 117throughl22.] In Jackson, the court gave no greater 
weight to the "closing agent's" testimony than that of the president of the bank, who did not 
even attend the closing. The facts are identical in this case, wherein senior vice; president of 
the lending, Paul Toller testified, yet had no knowledge of the disclosures provided at closing, 
because he did not attend. The evidence presented, and the basis of Mr. Dudley's testimony, 
render a rebuttable presumption, which placed the burden on Utah First to show they had 
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strictly complied with TILA. The incorrect findings of the district court has resulted in 
mistaken conclusions unsupported by the clear weight of evidence. Utah First, produced no 
one present at the closing who could speak to the responsibility of Utah First's obligation. 
The foregoing gives rise to the first required material disclosure, the Notice of Right to 
Cancel. Ms. Ellett's, the closing agent for the title company, testified that she provided 
instruction on the right to cancel and simultaneously proffered the election not to cancel, along 
with the acknowledgment of receipt. Again, this fails to meet the burden of establishing Utah 
First's compliance, as the obligation to make TILA disclosures rests with Utah First, not the 
title company and closing agent. See 15U.S.C $ 1631(b). Ms. Ellett's proffer of her election 
not to cancel during the transaction, would confuse any reasonable borrower. Furthermore, by 
having Mr. Dudley sign a certificate of non-rescission on the date of the transaction, Utah First 
suggested Mr. Dudley had foreclosed his right of rescission. Ms. Ellett also testified that 
should Mr. Dudley rescind, he could deliver the notice of rescission and "let us both know if 
they've cancelled the loan or one or the other." [R.1256: June 21, 2010 Trans, at page 126, 
lines 3 through 23.] Pursuant to Regulation Z § 226.23, the notice of rescission must be 
specifically delivered to the creditor. The convoluted information received at closing, by way 
of Ms. Ellett's testimony, would only serve to further confuse the issue of the requirements or 
Mr. Dudley's right to rescind, if he had that right for three days, and how to properly exercise 
that right. If the delivery of the notice of right to cancel can be construed in two very different 
ways, it can not be shown to comply with the "clearly and conspicuous" standards under TILA 
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and Regulation Z, Part 226.17. With the evidence presented, the district court erred in finding 
the notice of right to cancel was received, and further, that three copies were provided. 
Ms. Ellett testified that she has a settlement statement and Utah First had a settlement 
statement that they sent to her. Ms. Ellett testified that she compared the HUD 1 and her First 
American Settlement Statement, and further testified that the amounts were the same, with 
exception of "$7,000 taxes which were paid" by Mr. Dudley. [R. 1256: June 21, 2010 Trans, 
at Page 115, lines 13 - 24.] This constituted the disclosure of the finance charge controlled by 
the $35 threshold under 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i). If this court compares the two settlement 
statements, evidence will show a discrepancy. Ms. Ellett's First American Settlement does 
not have a place for Mr. Dudley to sign, acknowledging receipt, therefore, does not even give 
rise to the rebuttable presumption of delivery as argued above. 
Utah First offered Plaintiff s Exhibit 13. Defendants' obj ected to the admission of this 
exhibit, on the grounds that the best evidence was the US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development Settlement Statement, Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, was the best evidence, and signed 
and initialed on each page by Mr. Dudley. The last page of Plaintiff s Exhibit 13, included the 
addendum to HUD-1 Settlement Statement, signed by Mr. Dudley, which does not comport 
with the First American Settlement Statement in its form or substance, wherein, it is obvious 
that the last page of Plaintiff s Exhibit 13 is actually the last page of the HUD-1 Settlement 
Statement, Plaintiffs Exhibit 6. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-617, writings bearing 
obvious alterations, must account for the appearance of alteration and must show that the 
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writing: (1) was made by another without the party's concurrence; (2) was made with the 
consent of the parties affected by it; (3) was otherwise properly or innocently made; or (4) does 
not change the meaning or language of the instrument. Without an adequate explanation of 
the altered writing, the writing is inadmissible. This is important, because the First American 
Settlement Statement, which has not been proved to have been provided to Mr. Dudley, is not 
exact in the charges disclosed. The $42.99 that the district court excluded from the finance 
charge does not appear on the HUD-1, HUD-1 a or Itemization. Utah First has not shown that 
this charge was ever disclosed to Mr. Dudley, nor that it was actually paid. Because this 
charge was never disclosed to Mr. Dudley, the district court erroneously concluded that the 
$42.99 charge for "Survey to Pest Inspection to Cottonwood Improvement District" was not 
a finance charge as that term is used within 15 U.S.C. § 1605. (the Cottonwood Improvement 
District does not do pest inspection surveys) 
TILA provides for charges to be exempt from the finance charge, if the charges are bona 
fide and reasonable, and are actually paid. There were several instances, wherein evidence 
showed that the charges were not "bona fide and reasonable" and not actually paid. As 
previously stated, the $42.99 charge that the district court found to have been excluded from 
the finance charge, was never shown by Utah First to have been paid. There was no testimony 
or evidence that the $42.99 was a survey to pest inspection fee, as found by the district court. 
There was no testimony or evidence that the $42.99 was ever paid to Cottonwood 
Improvement District, as no bill was presented nor check produced. Utah First argued that 
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First American Title Insurance was to blame for the unexplained charge. This Court should 
reject this premise, as the closing agent is not responsible to make accurate disclosures under 
TILA. This obligation is Utah First's, as is their strict liability for non compliance. 
The district court was erroneous when it concluded that the second appraisal the loan 
was based on, was not inflated, therefore exempt from the finance charge. Mr. Dudley 
purchased a home. Mr. Dudley had come to America just one short year prior to that, and after 
working diligently to lay the groundwork, was ready to bring his family, to Utah, to live. Mrs. 
Dudley who had stayed in England with the kids, looked at many houses with him, but she 
picked out a home. The Dudleys' had money, but, no credit history. Mr. Dudley was just 
starting out, and paid cash, One Million Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,300,000.00). 
The Dudleys' purchased their home, as is, being advised by the Seller of water damage. [R. 
182] The Dudleys spent Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) to repair this water damage. 
[Plaintiffs trial exhibit 8: Monthly Statements, Dec. 2007] Mr. Dudley provided his original 
purchase contract to Dave Bastian, reflecting his purchase price of $1,300,000.00 and 
disclosure of the water damage. Mr. Dudley testified that the appraisal that Utah First initial 
provided him was for $1,330,000.00. Utah First obtained a second appraisal, without Mr. 
Dudley's knowledge or approval, which was the basis for the amount funded. The second 
appraisal was based on no water damage, and excluded the MLS listing price, and showed the 
Property to have been valued at $1,950,000.00, which was more than a thirty percent (30%) 
increase in value. Utah First offered no testimony controverting the second appraisal, nor 
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proof that it was a bona fide and reasonable charge, and Utah First relied upon it, and 
somehow, that was proof enough for the district court to find that it was not inflated and a bona 
fide and reasonable charge. To the degree that Utah First based the funding on the inflated 
valuation of Mr. Dudley's home, Mr. Dudley argued that portion should be imputed as a 
finance charge and not a cost. 
Mr. Dudley argues that Utah First listed charges as costs, when Utah First intended to 
keep them, although allocated as third party fees. This was a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 
1638(A)(2)(B)(iii), which requires "accurate disclosure amounts" if the payment is on the 
creditor's behalf. Utah First argued that they could charge whatever they want, and Mr. 
Dudley concede's that they can, but not without accurate disclosure of the portion paid to third 
parties and to Utah First directly, which constitutes the cost of credit, which under TILA, 
defines the finance charge. Therefore, all of the third party costs retained should have been 
included in the finance charge by Utah First, along with the unreasonable charges. Utah First 
is required to return any unearned fee, the costs as described above are considered an unearned 
fee, wherein Mr. Dudley's assertion stems. The defense to foreclosure, exercised by the 
Dudleys, as prescibed under 15 U.S.C § 1635(i), is available when the finance charge is 
understated by more than Thirty Five Dollars ($3 5.00), that the finance charge was understated 
by nearly One Thousand Dollars, without calculating overcharged interest for mis-application 
of payments made by the Dudleys. Utah First understated the finance charge, which exceeded 
the $35 tolerance set forth under 15 U.S.C.§ 1635(i). Therefore Mr. Dudley had a right to 
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rescind and he exercised that right. 
Mr. Dudley repeatedly testified that he was looking for a fixed rate loan and that he was 
offered a fixed rate loan by Utah First. This claim was supported by Utah First's own 
underwriting documentation and testimony by David Bastian. Dave Bastian repeatedly 
testified that he told Mr. Dudley that it was a fixed rate loan, meaning fixed for five years, then 
the rate would adjust. Mr. Dudley had no understanding of the fixed above a variable rate 
loan, and took Dave Bastian's word, and no reason to believe that he was not getting the fixed 
rate loan. Mr. Dudley testified that, on the day of closing, he asked Dave B»astian if the 
documents he was executing were for the same fixed rate loan that they had been discussing. 
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors, specify that the term "fixed is generally 
interpreted to mean that the rate will not be changed and that the creditor has not reserved the 
right to change it at a later date." 74 Fed. Reg. at 5373. This was Mr. Dudley's belief of what 
fixed meant, and Utah First intentionally misrepresented the true cost of the loan to Mr. 
Dudley, and changed the terms on the day of closing. A creditor can not change the terms of 
credit if it makes the disclosures provided inaccurate. Mr. Dudley was only provided a Good 
Faith Estimate, which failed to indicate what the loan program was. Mr. Dudley relied on Utah 
First's representations that the loan would be a fixed rate. The district court has found that the 
disclosures provided to Mr. Dudley prior to the closing, which was only one day, was a "work 
in progress" that was subject to change. After providing the disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1639(a), a creditor may "not change the terms of the extension of credit if such changes make 
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the disclosures inaccurate, unless new disclosures are provided that meet the requirements of 
this section." 15 U.S.C. § 1639(B)(2)(A). The facts support Mr. Dudley's contention that the 
disclosures provided before closing were different than the documents executed at closing. 
Utah First failed to provide Mr. Dudley with new disclosures upon the changes in the terms 
of the loan, which is a violation of TILA. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah First violated Mr. Dudley's federal consumer protection rights, in failing to 
disclose the material nature of the loan. Utah First failed to respond to Mr. Dudley's notice 
of rescission. Utah First has been unjustly enriched by the willful and intentional violation of 
15 U.S.C. § 1635(b), in refusing to comply with the statutory language, upon receipt of a 
lawful notice of rescission, which requires strict adherence. 
It is essential, for the uniform application of the non-judicial foreclosure policy in Utah, 
for this Court to interpret these conflicting statutes and review and correct the errors made by 
the district court. Mr. Dudley had a right to rescission and exercised his right under Federal 
law. This Court, upon review of the evidence, should reverse the district court's findings, find 
a lack of standing existed, an unfairly and poorly, full adjudication of the claims and 
controversies between the parties, Award an order returning the Dudley's to the possession of 
their home, and an award of attorney's fees costs and damages, substantially related to this 
miscarriage of justice. 
31 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
n DATED this _/ /_ day of May, 2011 
Clayne I. Corey 
Attorney f©r Appellant/Defendant 
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